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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tion likewise falls. 8 Thus, emancipation by marriage in France is
in effect dependent upon parental consent.
In Louisiana, since parental consent is essential for judicial
emancipation, it should also be necessary for emancipation by
marriage. The prior Louisiana jurisprudence-which is disre-
garded by the present decision-is more in harmony with other
provisions Of the Civil Code, particularly those regarding judicial
emancipation. If the refusal of a selfish parent or tutor to consent
to the minor's marriage could be considered as "ill-treatment"
within the intendment of Article 387, it would be possible to obtain
a judicial emancipation. In view of the fact that the present deci-
sion was based on the 1908 amendment of Article 382 which re-
fers only to minors who have reached the age of eighteen, it is
open to question whether the court meant to leave the rule that,
under similar circumstances, a minor under eighteen would not
be emancipated.
J.G.C.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL TO PROVE A CONTEMPORAN-
EOUS COLLATERAL AGREEMENT-In answer to a suit for the balance
due on a written contract of sale of roofing material, defendant
contended that the plaintiff orally agreed to supervise the appli-
cation of the roofing and to guarantee the roof for ten years. The
defendant reconvened for damages resulting from faulty applica-
tion of the roofing. Held, that parol evidence may be introduced
by defendant to prove such an oral agreement, since it does not
contradict the writing and would be in the nature of a contempo-
raneous collateral agreement to do something in addition to the
obligation embodied in the written contract; but that defendant
did not discharge her burden of proving the existence of the oral
agreement. Brandin Slate Co., Inc. v. Fornea, 183 So. 572 (La.
App. 1938).
The rule precluding admission of parol evidence to add to,
subtract from, contradict or vary the terms of a valid written in-
18. 1 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1925)
653-654, no 618; 2 Marcad6, Explication Th6orique et Pratique du Code Napo-
leon (5 ed. 1852) 267, no 476; 5 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais (2
ed. 1876) 216-217, no 195; 8bis Beudant, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (2 ed.
1936) 301, no 1716; 1 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1897)
831-832, § 129; 3 Huc, Commentaire Th~orique et Pratique du Code Civil
(1892) 448, no 466. See Art. 476, French Civil Code.
[Vol. I
NOTES
strument is found in both civil' and common law.2 Although Ar-
ticle 22763 would seem to extend the prohibition to apply to agree-
ments made subsequent to the written contract, it has long been
held that the rule in this state is substantially the same as that at
common law.4 Thus in the recent case of Salley v. Louvierel the
Supreme Court said that "The words 'or since' [in Article 2276]
have reference to the phrase 'what may have been said,' and not
to what may have been agreed to, since the making of the written
contract," so "the meaning is that parol evidence as to what the
parties to a written contract may have said at any time shall not
be admitted for the purpose of proving that they had an antece-
dent or a contemporaneous agreement contrary to that which was
reduced to writing."
That parol may be introduced to prove an independent col-
lateral agreement is a well recognized exception to the general
rule.7 The question presented in the principal case is whether the
bond between the two alleged agreements is sufficiently close to
prevent proof of the oral agreemeht 5 "The test to determine
whether the alleged parol agreement comes within the field em-
braced by the written one is to compare the two and determine
'whether parties, situated as were the ones to the contract, would
naturally and normally include the one in the other if it were
made.' " Although the general rule is everywhere cited in almost
identical terms, it is inconsistently applied to various sets of
facts.10
In Louisiana parol has been held inadmissible to show that
the plaintiff had agreed to give a newspaper advertiser certain
1. See Corbett v. Costello, 8 La. Ann. 427, 428 (1853).
2. 1 Greenleaf, Law of Evidence (15 ed. 1892) 372, § 275.
3. Art. 2276, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Neither shall parol evidence be ad-
mitted against or beyond what is contained in the acts, nor on what may have
been said before, or at the time of making them, or since." (Italics supplied.)
4. Moore v. Hampton, 3 La. Ann. 192 (1848); Jamison v. Ludlow, 3 La.
Ann. 492 (1848).
5. 183 La. 92, 162 So. 811 (1935).
6. 183 La. at 98, 162 So. at 813.
7. 5 Wigmore, Evidence (2 ed. 1923) 306, § 2430.
8. 3 Williston, Contracts (1936) 1832, § 637. Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377,
160 N.E. 646, 68 A.L.R. 239 (1928).
9. Wagner v. Marcus, 288 Pa. 579, 136 Atl. 847, 848 (1927). Cf. 3 Williston,
Contracts (1936) 1833, § 638.
10. Wigmore, Evidence (2 ed. 1923) 306, § 2430. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana, in referring to Articles 2236 and 2276 in Robinson v. Britton, 137
La. 863, 865, 69 So. 282, 283 (1915), quoted from the court of appeal decision
of the same case: "'These articles, and especially the latter, have been the
subject of a vast number of decisions by our Supreme Court, and some of
them are quite difficult to reconcile with the plain provisions and obvious
purposes of the Code.'"
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"write ups" in addition to the space bought;1 or to show that a
vendee by authentic act of sale had agreed to share equally with
the vendor any profits from resale of the real estate purchased;'
12
or that the vendor of phonographs had agreed verbally to have
the merchandise delivered at least two weeks before Christmas,
and to send a salesman to Louisiana to assist in demonstrating
and selling the instruments.' Parol has been admitted, however,
to show that the lessor of certain property gave verbal notice to
the lessee that no liquor could be sold on the premises, though
the restriction was not included in the written instrument;" and
the vendee of a second hand car was permitted to show that the
consideration named for the car included a sum for which the
vendor agreed verbally to secure collision insurance for the pur-
chaser."3
In accordance with the weight of Louisiana authority and
under an application of the accepted criterion, it would seem that
the parties in the instant case "naturally and normally" would
have included the alleged collateral agreement-an important
guaranty-in the written contract; thus the parol proof should
have been barred. No harm was done in the principal case, since
the evidence offered did not prove the existence of the purported
oral agreement, yet this decision should not be taken as a prece-
dent for further relaxation of the rule protecting the integrity of
written contracts.
C. O'Q.
SEPARATION FROM BED AND BOARD-"MUTUAL WRONGS" Doc-
TRINE---A wife sued for separation from bed and board on the
grounds of slander, defamation and cruel treatment. In denying
these allegations, the husband averred-without making any re-
conventional demand-that his wife had an ungovernable temper
and that, as a result of her cruelty to him, they had been living
separate and apart for more than two years. On original hearing
the plaintiff was awarded a decree of separation from bed and
11. The Item Company, Ltd., v. Wormington Machinery Power & Equip-
ment Co., Inc., 4 La. App. 519 (1926).
12. Pfeiffer v. Nienaber, 143 La. 601, 78 So. 977 (1918) (O'Niell, J., dis-
senting).
13. Brenard Mfg. Co. v. M. Levy, Inc., 161 La. 496, 109 So. 43 (1926).
14. New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company v. Darms, 39 La. Ann.
766, 2 So. 230 (1887).
15. McConnell v. Harris Chevrolet Co., Inc., 147 So. 827 (La. App. 1933).
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